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Discussant's Response to "Using and Evaluating 
Audit Decision Aids" 
Stephen J. Aldersley 
Clarkson Gordon 
It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to comment on a paper dealing with 
a subject which has occupied a considerable portion of my time during the past 
few years—Audit Decision Aids. It should, therefore, not come as too much of 
a surprise that I agree with much of what is in the Ashton-Willingham paper. 
Throughout the paper I found myself nodding in agreement with the points 
being made. However, there are still a number of areas where I think the 
authors' efforts at organizing and categorizing the issues have led to unwar-
ranted oversimplification. I will direct my commentary to these areas. I intend 
to follow the basic outline of the Ashton-Willingham paper and will conclude my 
comments with some observations on what I perceive to be a couple of 
particularly difficult audit areas that just might lead to important decision aids. 
The theme of this paper can probably be stated along the following lines: 
Decision aids have a role, . . . but they need a cost benefit justification. The 
theme for my comments is related to the definition of decision aids adopted in 
this paper, i.e., "any explicit procedure for the generation, evaluation and 
selection of alternatives (courses of action) that is designed for practical 
application and multiple use.'' When you read the rest of the paper you wonder 
whether the authors have used a complete decision aid definition. They appear 
to have set up several straw men that are subsequently criticized and 
discredited. Would it not be appropriate to include some evaluative criteria in 
the definition of the decision aid? My contention is that if you don't, you may 
have a decision anti-aid instead. The courses of action should be "towards 
some well-defined objective" in a more complete definition of a decision aid. 
Development Issues 
One oversimplication in the paper is the distinction made between 
research-based as opposed to experience-based development approaches. The 
paper implies a dichotomy whereas, in practice, things are not nearly as simple. 
Although a decision aid may use a research base during development, it will not 
evolve into a tool solely from that perspective. The reason decision aids are 
often even considered is usually experience-based. Although one might argue 
that this is empirical research, the empiricism tends to be anecdotal rather than 
based on any research design. There are many examples from the past 20 or 
30 years. For instance, analytical auditing and the related flow-charting 
technique grew out of our audit practice needs for concise system descriptions. 
Statistical sampling was implemented because of actual deficiencies encoun-
tered in the use of non-statistical techniques. Regression-based analytical 
review was introduced because of dissatisfaction with the quality of judgmental 
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results and we implemented assertion-based auditing to clarify the link 
between internal control work and the primary audit objectives. In all of these 
cases the initial need for the technique arose out of common problems 
encountered in practical application of audit techniques. I imagine other firms 
have had similar experiences. 
However, it would be an oversimplification on my part if I were to 
completely discount the importance of a research base behind any one of these 
audit techniques. The development of any decision aid is not a static process. It 
is highly iterative. Initial stages of the decision aid may be built on prototypes, 
whether or not the decision aid is computer based. Field testing will play an 
important role in the initial stages, but practical application is the principal 
source of many refinements and the future evolution of the decision aid. 
None of this should come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the practical 
application of decision aids, particularly in the context of an audit practice. 
Decision Aids and Training 
Decision aids are presented almost as an exclusive alternative to training. 
But the reality in an audit practice situation is that decision aids are often a part 
of training. 
The entire discussion ignores the nature of the auditing business. Our new 
staff are well educated, intelligent and motivated, but they have no practical 
experience. Despite university courses, their practical knowledge of the audit 
process is limited. In many cases, at least in the Canadian environment, they do 
not even have an accounting or auditing education. All of this is exacerbated by 
the need for our staff to develop it extremely rapidly. We fully expect our staff 
to act as senior on most, if not all, of our small audits at the start of their second 
year. They quickly become seniors on very large audits and then managers in 
charge of a staff together with a reasonable portfolio of clients. In this 
environment, decision aids are not as important as training aids particularly in 
view of the fact that a significant amount of learning occurs on the job. This is an 
important aspect of the auditing business because training is one of the largest 
costs in a public accounting practice. The overlap between decision aids and 
training aids is, therefore, considerable. 
Claims about Decision Aids 
Ashton-Willingham list a number of claims made about decision aids (e.g., 
accuracy improvement and consistency, communication, distribution of exper-
tise, staff training, ease of documentation effort, and time savings) in the 
context of their evaluation. From the practice point of view, many of these 
claims are assessed on a specific basis. In some cases, e.g., statistical sampling 
and regression analysis, the accuracy can be established through analytical 
means whereas empirical methods are necessary in other areas. For example, 
one of the major benefits of decision aids is the common language they 
introduce for technical matters so that professional staff who encounter 
problems are able to communicate the problem and then understand the 
response. The evidence for this is the high degree of consultation between staff 
members on technical matters; something which we observe in our internal 
quality control reviews. 
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A primary objective of decision aids is often time savings and this can be 
evaluated very directly using year-to-year comparisons with, and without, use 
of particular techniques. Although in some cases the learning curve confounds 
the results, it is still possible to get a reasonable estimate of time savings from 
this approach. Thus, although many decision aid benefits are not measured 
with a design-based approach, there are often semi-formal measures taken to 
determine whether or not a particular decision aid has achieved its objective. 
Effects on Judgment 
The observation that a decision aid increases rather than decreases the 
emphasis on judgment is entirely consistent with our experience. So often we 
find that our staff recognize that they have a problem simply because we have 
structured the issue for them. This permits a much more rational, consensus-
based approach to resolving difficult situations. It also raises the issue of 
structuring the judgment inputs to a decision aid. As I mentioned at the outset, 
a complete decision aid should be capable of achieving a well-defined objective, 
and therefore some structuring of the judgmental inputs to the decision aid will 
often be necessary before one can consider the decision aid complete in any 
practical sense. 
The illustration dealing with increasing versus decreasing consistency is not 
entirely pertinent to the critical issue here. The possibility that sample extents 
(sizes) vary more when a decision aid is employed may result from an 
incomplete or improperly defined decision aid. Although within the context of 
the particular task, consistency is desirable, there will be cases when the 
consistency requirement is with respect to a more general objective. For 
example, if one restricts consideration to the sample extent issue, using a 
sample size of 60 all the time is certainly consistent but, from the more 
important audit objective, it may be like a broken watch—correct only twice a 
day. If the consistency is not with respect to the correct objective, then the 
benefits of the decision aid may be foregone. 
I can illustrate the consistency issue somewhat further by drawing on one of 
the decision aids used in our audit practice, our "source of assurance plan," 
which we use to document our risk analysis for a particular financial statement 
assertion. Using four categories for the major sources of assurance, our 
auditors would begin with an assessment of inherent assurance and follow with 
an assessment of internal control assurance. Figure 1 presents three quite 
different approaches to the source of assurance analysis which result in quite 
different audit strategies. In Case 1, there is no reliance placed on internal 
control and very limited reliance placed on analytical review since the majority 
of the audit assurance is obtained through substantive tests of details. This can 
be contrasted with Case 2 in which a regression-based analytical review is 
performed but is also supplemented by a preliminary review and evaluation of 
specific assertion-related internal controls. The 3rd case represents an 
approach that would involve a dual purpose test on specific internal controls 
together with re-performance of the control procedures. 
The important thing in all three cases is that the total assurance is the same. 
Because each of the factor limitations are set on a firm-wide basis, we have a 
very high degree of consistency with the applied audit effort in terms of the 
overall assurance objective. 
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STRATEGY ALTERNATIVES FOR AN ASSERTION 
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Figure 1 
While presumably the staff will choose the approach which is the least 
costly in their particular circumstance, other factors may enter into their 
decision. For example, some of our auditors simply aren't comfortable with 
relying on internal controls and will prefer to take a substantive audit approach. 
Others are not comfortable with regression analysis techniques and will prefer 
either the substantive testing or the internal control approach. It is important 
to recognize that, in any situation, the assessment of the cost involved is not a 
simple procedure and can vary quite significantly from one situation to the next, 
even though they may appear similar. 
Some idea of the degree of variability in the situation can be seen in the box 
plot in Figure 2 which shows the distribution of assurance factors for various 
source of assurance analyses from a number of representative sampling 
situations. An important objective of the source of assurance decision aid is to 
control any undesirable variability, i.e.,we attempt to make sure that the audit 
effort is of a relatively consistent level across our audit practice. However, 
within that constraint, we permit a considerable amount of variability in order to 
accommodate specific needs of the situation (you could argue that this is just 
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The above box plots show the distribution of assurance factors for the source of assurance 
analysis on 485 representative samples from 60 randomly selected audit engagements. 
Figure 2 
Effects on the Firm 
One of the realities of modern day auditing is the increased structure of 
audit methodologies. This is clearly a necessary response to the increased 
complexity of the business environment that we face. Not only are our clients 
becoming more complex, but our own auditing standards are becoming more 
and more prescriptive as they gradually evolve into a form of decision aid. For 
example, SAS 47 makes explicit requirements for planning audits and evaluat-
ing their results and the new "expectation gap" SASs contain some very 
explicit recommendations with respect to audit approach. This trend is unlikely 
to abate in the foreseeable future. 
Automation is often viewed as a potential substitute for labor, even in the 
auditing profession. An important prerequisite for effective audit automation is 
the increased structure of audit methodologies. There is a direct relationship 
between the degree of structure in an audit approach and its amenability to 
automation. Without structure, you will probably develop an expensive printing 
press if you automate an audit task. 
Although it is an important factor, one must recognize that automation of an 
existing manually performed process requires a significant time saving in order 
to offset the automation cost. True substitution is often possible only by 
developing a new process. There are significant limits here in the audit 
profession. The auditor acts as an interface between the client's business 
environment and his audit objectives. The primary practice skill is adaptability 
due to the wide range of clients and the constantly changing business 






















factors introduce limitations on the extent to which the substitution of capital 
for labor can be effective in an audit practice situation. 
Decision Aids and the Art of Auditing 
Decision aids have been used by auditors for decades, ever since the first 
auditing textbooks were published. While these early decision aids were often 
limited to a listing of audit steps, they were the forerunners of the computer-
ized decision support/expert systems in use today. I predict that we will see 
more use of decision aids in the future. Our environment will only become more 
complex, yet the basic raw material of our business, the people we hire and 
train, are not going to be inherently more intelligent than in the past. However, 
because of their environment they are probably going to be better able to make 
the best use of the decision aids we provide them. Ashton-Willingham have 
provided a timely overview of the important issue of audit decision aid 
evaluation and I think they will most surely have achieved their objective of 
"stimulating discussion among auditing practitioners and researchers." 
I would like to leave you now with two of my favorite "chestnut'' problems, 
concerning the "art" of auditing. Perhaps they may someday be amenable to a 
decision aid approach. 
One of the most interesting morsels of audit folklore is that legendary 
technique demonstrated by the experienced auditor who walks into a client, 
looks around, and decides that the inventory is wrong based on what he has 
seen. The "smell test" is a mysterious and unexplainable procedure applied by 
the auditing profession. When it works, we all admire the auditor who 
performed the feat, but when it fails, no one seems to notice. How does the 
smell test work? How does an experienced auditor determine that a particular 
transaction is sufficiently unusual to warrant further investigation? We have a 
lot of audit staff who would like to be able to duplicate this feat. 
A possibly more difficult problem is the issue of auditing accounting 
estimates. The real problem here is what constitutes a best estimate? The 
mean? The median? The mode? Even if we were all well calibrated Bayesians 
we would often still be in trouble if the range of acceptable values was ten times 
materiality. Part of the solution may be to increase disclosure when the range of 
acceptable values is unacceptably large. But one of the interesting paradoxes of 
auditing is that when the range of acceptable values is several times materiality, 
the chance of the estimate disagreeing materially with the eventual outcome 
turns out to be extremely high but the chance of an accounting error is actually 
considerably less. The paradox lies in the fact that all auditors believe and say 
the opposite. Can we solve this problem with a decision aid? 
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